JUST LIE

Is it right to tell a lie for a good cause? Maureen Ramsay in her co-authored book, The Politics of Lying: Implications for Democracy (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000) suggests that at times when national security is concerned lies and deceit are permissible. She recognises that there are legitimate and illegitimate uses of a falsehood in the same way that there are legitimate and illegitimate uses of force when it comes to conflicts between nations. She uses the just war criteria to examine the ethics of lying. On the first criterion of just cause, the justice of a lie would depend on the cause for which it is undertaken. One would need to know whether there were other means available to achieve the just end; whether the harm caused by the lie is outweighed by the good achieved; and whether there is a reasonable chance of success in achieving the end through these means. Moreover, the means would have to be justified, not only because politicians would be acting in our name and in our interests, but because the public would have to consent to the deception in advance, in order to comply with democratic principles.

Journalists who follow courses on ethics as part of their training are probably familiar with the “just lie” theory. One of the problems with this theory is the potential legitimisation of the culture of deception. We see the consequences of this in contemporary Russia, especially with regards to the invasion of Ukraine. Ramsay herself acknowledges that “even if secrecy and deception could be justified to protect a vital interest, the costs in terms of the toll they take on democratic principles alone could be said to outweigh their benefits” (Ramsay, 35). Deception and lies are not only problematic because of their detrimental impact on democracy, they affect relationships and personal communication. Aquinas again has something to say about this.

TRUTHFULNESS AS A VIRTUE

In article 1 of the 109th Question in Summa Theologiae (London, New York: New Blackfriars, 1963), Aquinas speaks of truth as a virtue; he is concerned with a moral skill or a habit by which a person makes speech truthful. Making speech truthful is at the heart of Aquinas’s understanding of the purpose of communication. He believes that without the communication of truths there can be no society at all, there would be no shared plans, no common way of acting, no mutual pursuit of goods. In the absence of a willingness to communicate truths honestly and accurately, or in the absence of trust that others will participate in the ordered communication of truths, there can be no stable society.

It is worth noting that Aquinas’s virtue of truth is connected to the virtue of justice. Aquinas also speaks about “communication of oneself,” “that truth [pertains to this virtue] whereby a man, both in life and in speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are” (ST II–II, q. 109, a. 3, ad. 3).

There are many similarities between Aquinas’s and Williams’ approaches to truth. Both emphasise truthfulness and trust as conditions of living in society. They see sincerity (Williams) or simplicity rather than duplicity (Aquinas) as necessary for truthful communication of the “self.” In other words, truthfulness is essential for social well-being, and this is provided by people whose words align with their beliefs rather than “showing one thing outwardly while having another in the heart.” To put it simply, telling lies, promoting falsehoods and living a lie are neither good for the individual nor the society.