

Blue Labour + Red Tory = Christian Democracy?

Nicholas Townsend

Christian Democracy is a largely continental European movement of which little is known in the UK. Yet it has many deep and valuable insights from which British politics could benefit. This article presents an overview of the history of the Christian Democratic movement, explains the content and coherence of its economic, social and political principles, addresses some of the sceptical questions it evokes and locates it in relation to the Red Tory and Blue Labour movements in the UK.

Introduction¹

If you are British, how much do you know about the Netherlands – its recent history, its culture, its politics? How much Dutch can you speak? Even though the Netherlands is one of the UK's closest neighbours, it is fair to say that most British people know very little about the country. Yet the same is not true in reverse: many Dutch people not only speak English but are familiar with much in British life. One reason for this is that BBC 1 and BBC 2 have long been available on terrestrial television in the Netherlands; some shows that might seem very British, or English, have been much loved. (I recall a Dutch friend enthusing about *The Vicar of Dibley*.)

Something parallel is true about Britain and the Continent-wide phenomenon of Christian Democratic politics. We in Britain, including many who are involved in politics here, know little about Christian Democracy, indeed often next to nothing. This is even though this movement has been immensely significant in Europe during the past century, especially since World War Two. Currently the group in the European Parliament that brings together Christian Democrats (known as the European People's Party) has the largest number of MEPs. It has a member party in all 28 EU countries except the UK.² One thing most British people do know is that Europe's most populous country, Germany, is governed by Christian Democrats; their leader, Angela Merkel, is as well-known as her predecessor 20 years ago, Helmut Kohl, was then. In fact Christian Democrats have governed the Federal Republic of Germany for 47 of the 66 years since 1949.

Although we in Britain do not know much about them, Christian Democratic politicians in Continental countries tend to have a fair knowledge of British political life. Reasons for this include the intensity and longevity of debate in Britain about EU membership, even if this debate must seem to them odd, indeed oddly antiquated: they have long seen federalism – still almost a taboo word in British discussion – as a vital way of dispersing power and of combatting the nationalism that had torn Europe apart in the first half of the twentieth century.

Yet British readers, immediately sceptical perhaps, might respond: but so-called Christian Democracy is the equivalent of the UK Conservative Party, and the main parties in Germany (for example), the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats, correspond with the Tory and Labour parties. However, this misleads more than it illuminates, even if it is frequent journalistic shorthand.

My argument here will be that the Christian Democratic tradition has a coherent political stance, one that is clearly distinct from those of any of the prominent parties contesting the 2015 UK general election and that could bring a great deal to politics across the English-speaking world. In 2010, who would have imagined that as many as seven party leaders would feature in a televised election debate this year? Yet none of them represented a Christian Democratic position.

I have referred already to possible sceptical reactions, and these have long been a feature of British attitudes to Christian Democracy. Is the use of the label 'Christian' authentic or only window dressing? Can Christianity generate a political position that is even close to being specific enough to give the basis for a party platform?

Haven't Christians long been fully welcome in all existing British political parties? Would having one party that self-identifies as Christian not foster division within churches? Should such a party use the term 'Christian' in its name? In a society characterised increasingly by religious plurality, is it not best for politics to be fully secularised? These questions all raise important issues, although we shall be able to look at only some of them in what follows. I shall focus on the ideas and ideals that define Christian Democracy, but a few words about the history of the movement will give some context.

Parties and movements

Democracy itself remains remarkably young, in Europe as elsewhere. It was not until after the First World War that the universal franchise of men and women began to become the norm in European countries (in the UK it was introduced in 1928), and universal male franchise had preceded it by only a few decades, if that long – yet today we take universal franchise to be definitive of democracy. More or less from the beginning of moves towards democracy in Europe in the nineteenth century, there were political parties of Christian inspiration, and by 1900 there was a recognisable Christian Democratic movement.

Two main factors drove its rise: defence against an aggressive liberal secularism of a kind that was not present in Britain in the same period (even if it is now); and commitment to social reform that addressed the crisis of the conditions of workers in the aftermath of industrialisation. Each of these factors helped to generate a Christian Democratic position that contrasted clearly with both liberalism (to its right) and socialism (to its left). Both liberalism and socialism tended (on the Continent) to be secularist or overtly anti-religious. Liberalism, then the ideology of laissez-faire capitalism, opposed that sort of reform, while socialism advocated a class-based analysis and, in practice, a statist solution, both of which were repudiated by Christian Democrats. The Christian Democratic movement found itself in the middle of the political spectrum and came to be known by such terms as the 'dynamic centre'. Germany's CDU has always presented itself explicitly as a centre party. Already the way in which Christian Democracy differs from the UK Conservative Party will be becoming clear. It lies to its left.

There have been scores of Christian Democratic political parties in Europe since the movement began to cohere in the late nineteenth century. Their histories have been very varied. There are examples of great and sustained success, and others of descent into abuse of position and power. The most prominent case of the latter was in Italy where *Democrazia Cristiana*, the leading party in Italian politics for 50 years, was wound up in 1994 amidst well-founded allegations of extensive corruption. There have been more and less successful cases of renewal after decline; among the more successful are those of German Christian Democracy in the late 1960s after the 20-year era dominated by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and of Dutch Christian Democracy in the 1970s after heavy electoral defeat in 1967. There has been a long-term shift from separate Catholic and Protestant parties towards those which overcome that divide. The renewal in Dutch Christian Democracy led to exactly such an outcome, the formation from three parties (two Protestant and one Catholic) of one united party, Christian Democratic Appeal, which in the subsequent decades has had electoral success and a prominent place in government.³

Yet Christian Democracy has by no means been only about political parties. Surprisingly, the classic work on its history until its post-WW2 heyday was written by a British academic, Michael Fogarty. As he put it forty years later, Fogarty wrote on Christian Democracy for the same reason that Mallory climbed Everest: it was there. '[I]n front of me was a political and social movement by now of major importance in civic society as well as in Christianity, no less in fact than the leading force shaping Western Europe as it emerged from the disasters of the Second World War'.⁴ Fogarty refers here to Christian Democracy as a 'political and social movement', and his earlier major study brought out forcefully that Christian Democracy has to be seen as a broad and complex social movement, not just a set of political parties. Indeed it is more appropriate to refer to *movements*, plural. In the book's preface, Fogarty said:

May I also emphasise that this is not particularly a study of the Christian Democratic political parties? People in the Anglo-Saxon countries have a way of being blinded by parties and forgetting the social movements and the movements of Christian Action: that weightier part of the iceberg which lies for the most part below the vision of the British or American press.⁵

He was referring to the rich network of distinctively Christian social service agencies, educational bodies, workers' unions, employers' associations and youth movements that developed in the European countries in which, over the same period, Christian Democratic politics became established. If, as Fogarty claimed, British or American

observers tended to overlook them, this was partly because nothing quite comparable existed in their countries. One way of putting this point is that, while there are of course myriad Christian charities in English-speaking countries, the churches' ministry of *diakonia* - of practical service - has found expression in more institutionalised ways in some Continental countries. One thing that enables this is the various forms of 'church tax' that members (whether active or only nominal) pay in several countries. Still today, this generates funds for church-based social service work on a scale that is unimaginable in the UK and means that this work can become embodied in enduring structures.

These few paragraphs on Christian Democracy's history give only a flavour. But it is only if we grasp the ideas, the vision, to which the parties and social movements helped to give expression that we will be able to form a view on whether it could be pertinent to twenty-first century Britain.

Ideas and ideals

Perhaps the first of the sceptical questions I posed above about Christian Democracy comes most quickly to mind in English-speaking countries: is this movement in any sense really *Christian*, or does this word function only as a legitimising and, for some, an electorally appealing label? This is of course a highly important question to ask of any group or initiative that self-identifies with the name of Jesus Christ. It is especially pertinent in politics because it is true of any and every political movement that the prospect of gaining power always attracts some people who wish to wield it for self-serving ends, regardless of labels or professed principles. This is the *libido dominandi*, lust for domination, so vividly described by St Augustine.

Yet what any sustained study of Christian Democracy shows is the great seriousness with which many leading figures have taken both their Christian profession and the social issues they have to deal with. To give a flavour, here are the opening paragraphs of *Freedom Based on Responsibility*, the 100-page, 1994 edition of the CDU's statement of its principles and programme, this the first after Germany's reunification:

The Christian Democratic Union of Germany is a people's party which seeks to appeal to everyone in the country, whatever social stratum or grouping they belong to. Our policies are based on the Christian view of humanity and of human responsibility before God.

For us, humanity is God's creation and not the ultimate measure of all things. We are aware of human fallibility and the limitations to which political actions are subject. At the same time we are convinced that the human vocation is to shape the world in a spirit of ethical responsibility and that men and women are capable of doing so.

We know that no particular political programme can be derived from Christian beliefs. But the Christian view of humanity provides us with an ethical basis for responsible policies... The CDU is open to all who affirm the dignity and freedom of all humankind and support the basic beliefs which we derive from these for our policies. This is the basis for common action by Christians and non-Christians within the party.⁶

The text then locates the CDU in the context of Germany's history, before spelling out more fully its belief in human dignity and expounding its 'basic values': freedom, solidarity and justice. If we ever wonder what forms Angela Merkel's politics, this serious, clear and realistic vision no doubt gives a large part of the answer.

Nevertheless, how is the connection made between Christian commitment and political positions? More than any other single source, Christian Democratic thinking has been formed by Catholic Social Teaching (CST). This article is not the place to introduce the content of CST as such – although some of this will be articulated in what follows. Suffice it to say here that, as developed over the period since Pope Leo XIII's publication of *Rerum Novarum* in 1891, CST presents a vision in which each person both has dignity – immeasurable worth – that must be respected and also finds his or her own good in the common good. 'Official' Catholic Social Teaching needs to be seen in the context of wider Catholic social thought, which includes work by thinkers who both have been influenced by CST and, in turn, have helped to inspire developments within it. In relation to Christian Democracy, by far the most significant of these is the French philosopher Jacques Maritain whose prolific writing career lasted from the 1920s to the 1960s and included the widely-read *Christianity and Democracy*.⁷ He wrote this short book in the depths of World

War Two and it proved to be an inspiration for many working for reconstruction after 1945. Other significant figures include the German economist Heinrich Pesch and the Italian political thinker Luigi Sturzo.

In most Continental countries Christian Democracy has never had quite the closeness of connection with Protestant churches as there has been with Catholicism, even though many Protestants have been fully involved in Christian Democratic parties.⁸ That is partly due to the lack of a single authoritative voice in Protestantism to mirror that of the pope, and also to the scepticism of some prominent Protestant figures about Christian Democracy, for example Karl Barth.⁹

However the Netherlands gives us an important exception to that general point about the Protestant churches. In a way that bears comparison with CST – and also dating from the late nineteenth century – a number of Calvinists developed a body of Christian thought about society that has come to form a coherent tradition which, in turn, has profoundly influenced Dutch Christian Democratic politics. The figure of greatest stature within this is Abraham Kuyper, theologian, journalist and politician – he was Prime Minister from 1901-1905 – the breadth of whose impact in Dutch life was similar to that of William Gladstone in Britain.¹⁰ The Dutch neo-Calvinism generated by Kuyper and others has been a major influence in the Netherlands' Christian Democratic Appeal party, formed in the 1970s and continuing today (as mentioned earlier). Within this context, it has had to engage with Catholic Social Teaching, leading to discovery of common ground, as we shall see.

Economic vision: 'an ecological and social market economy'

Especially in Germany since WW2, Christian Democracy has made a reality of an economic vision that is, speaking precisely, neither capitalist nor socialist. This is the 'social market economy' developed in the era of Adenauer, and reconceived in the early 1990s to incorporate ecological responsibility, so becoming – at least in aspiration – an 'ecological and social market economy'.¹¹ For convenience the shorter label is often still used.

To defenders of capitalism's view that maximising return to capital (i.e., shareholder value) should be the primary driver of all economic activity, the 'social market economy' can appear dangerously close to socialism: it gives a full place to trade unions and favours workers' representatives on company boards ('worker co-determination'). Most importantly, it is founded on recognition of the social responsibility inherent in property ownership and therefore in business (in this following CST).

At the same time, to socialists the 'social market economy' can appear dangerously close to capitalism. This is simply because it is one kind of *market* economy (socialists have not been good at moral analysis of what people do in markets), and also because it recognises, indeed celebrates, the great benefits that can come from business enterprise. This said, there is truth in the socialist perception inasmuch as the neoliberal capitalism that has been hegemonic in the English-speaking world over the past 25 years has pressured Christian Democracy to shift where it stands; there is, for example, evidence of tension around this in the CDU statements referenced earlier.¹²

Christian Democracy's economic vision is barely understood in the UK, or in English-speaking discourse more generally. In particular, this discourse has found it hard to see positions that seem to be between capitalism and socialism as other than (uneasy) combinations of some bits of each – which Christian Democracy's social market economy is not. To illustrate, we can contrast it with Tony Blair's advocacy in the late 1990s of a 'third way'. Abandoning socialism's historic critique of capitalism, New Labour fervently embraced capitalism in the precise sense of the term: business driven by maximisation of the return on capital ('let it rip', Blair was reported as saying). At the same time it remained statist, in line with social democratic tradition: the operation of capitalism would generate tax revenues to finance more extensive state services.¹³ In contrast, Christian Democracy is not capitalist in that sense: return on capital or profit-making is a vitally important *means* to business's essentially social end, not the one overriding driver.¹⁴ Nor is it statist, as social democracy and socialism more widely have been in practice. To understand this point about statism, we need to look beyond economics to Christian Democracy's vision of social justice – to which we come later.

One more point can usefully be made about Christian Democracy's economic stance, in particular about its *origins*. As noted earlier, one of the CDU's 'basic values' is solidarity, and there is frequent appeal to this in its statements (manifesting an emphasis that marks Christian Democracy out from Conservative politics in the UK). In this respect Christian Democracy is drawing on CST, and there is a fascinating history of how the concept of solidarity became

central in CST. In brief, *Rerum Novarum* (RN) in 1891 articulated powerfully a vision of economic life that, in its fundamentals, is indistinguishable from that made real after WW2 in Germany's 'social market economy' – even though RN did not use the word 'solidarity'. One of this document's most striking features is the emphatic rejection of class conflict, which then was not just a reality across Europe but also the theoretical basis of socialism's critique of capitalism. An equally striking feature is RN's rejection of economic liberalism's dog-eat-dog vision of economic relations as not more than individuals competing in markets. Hugely influenced by RN, the German economist Heinrich Pesch articulated a comprehensive account of economics that eschewed both those positions and that he labelled by the adjective 'solidarist' and the noun 'solidarism'. For Pesch these terms conveyed the primary place of the good of the whole, whether that of a specific company or of a society overall, in which the good of each free participant is found. Pesch's influence on subsequent CST statements, while indirect, was great. His 'solidarism' was one (if not the) main inspiration for incorporation of the concept of 'solidarity' into papal statements from the late 1930s.¹⁵ Hence we may see as implicit in this very concept, on the one hand, rejection of both socialist class conflict and capitalism's competitive individualism, and, on the other hand, insistence that a good economic order can exist only as people deliberately act to bring it about. In this light we can understand Pope John Paul II's later description of solidarity as 'a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good'.¹⁶ The practice of solidarity is necessary if there is to be the sort of economy that Christian Democracy has favoured; no mere mechanism, whether competition or class conflict, will do.¹⁷

On economics and business there is a great need, still, for fresh thinking in English-speaking countries in the post-2008 crisis era, not least on the part of the main British political parties. Given the severity of the crisis, it is astonishing that political debate about economics in Britain has continued on its old, predictable tramlines: the Conservatives stand for neoliberal capitalism, and, ludicrously, dismiss any attempt to discuss this critically as 'anti-business'; in doing so they seem to cow Labour into submission. Is not Christian Democracy's social market or 'solidarist' economy, which transcends both socialism and capitalism, exactly what we need?

Social vision: the common good, freedom and justice

The CDU 'is a people's party which seeks to appeal to everyone..., whatever social stratum... they belong to'. This is the opening of the CDU statement I quoted earlier. At first it might strike the British reader as a mere platitude: does not any party want to do that? In fact it reflects the self-conscious repudiation by Christian Democracy of politics based on class or other categories that set people against each other, most importantly race. This is inherent also in the commitment to solidarity, as we have just seen. Christian Democracy's vision insists that society is a unity. In reflection of this, the Christian Democratic party in several countries is named the People's Party.

This does not mean, of course, that social conflicts of many kinds, some severe and ingrained, do not need to be addressed. The history of the countries in which Christian Democracy has flourished means no-one could think that.

Rather, it means that there is such a thing as the common good. To understand this often elusive yet, when one grasps it, brilliantly clear concept, consider as an analogy the music of a choir. Choral music can exist as the singers of each part do *different* things: in their action together they generate a good *for them all* which otherwise could not possibly exist for any of them. Moreover this good is not a later product or consequence, but it exists *as they sing*, as they participate in the common action. The good simply is what they do together.

This illustrates what the Christian tradition of political thought, and Christian Democracy within it, means by the common good. Your good and my good are found by participating in social life in the many different ways that together generate an immeasurably rich common good that benefits each of us. In this light we can understand, for example, the commitments to trade unions and codetermination.

Again, no-one in the countries in which Christian Democracy has flourished could be under the illusion that, for such common life actually to be good, *freedom* and *social justice* can be ignored. On the contrary, in Christian Democracy both these have been fundamentally important. The vision of freedom is twofold. On the one hand, basic freedoms must be robustly protected for all by legal rights; on the other hand, freedom is fulfilled when people exercise it for social goods that help to form the common good, rather than in arbitrary or purely self-oriented choices.¹⁸ The contrast is striking with the emphasis in English-speaking individualism on negative liberty, individuals' freedom from constraint, regardless of what this is then actually used for. Moreover individualism, which labels those views in which each person's good is inherently separate from that of each other's, sees

engagement in society instrumentally: it is a means to each individual's benefit. In this way of seeing things, the common good has no place; there is no common good.

The conception of social justice that developed in Christian Democracy is also very different from that most prominent in English-speaking discourse, especially in social democratic politics. The difference is especially that Christian Democracy is not statist: it does not presume that the primary agency for achieving justice across society is the state – even though it maintains that the state's fundamental responsibility is to ensure there is justice. The paradox is only apparent: central in the Christian Democratic vision is what in Dutch is called the *Middenveld*, the 'middle field', which refers to a 'vast network... of communities of all kinds, ideologies and sizes' between individuals and the state.¹⁹ These include schools, businesses, social service bodies, unions and employers' associations among many others. They might be associated explicitly with Christianity, and form part of the broader Christian Democratic movement; but just as often they are associated with a different religious or ideological stance. The visions of both Catholic Social Teaching and Kuyperian Dutch Calvinism give great prominence to the *Middenveld*, seeing the various kinds of body that emerge within it as reflecting the richness of God's bounty to humanity in creation. Similarly, CST insists on the principle of subsidiarity: the state must not take over from any non-state body what this properly does, as that would weaken both society and the state itself. Rather the state has a 'subsidiary' role: assisting non-state associations and communities to be what they should be. Dutch Calvinism conceives of several distinct spheres within society, among them business, education, the arts and healthcare, each different in its role and the goods it generates. As in CST, the state should not take over or absorb these spheres, but has a distinct role of ensuring that they remain what they properly are, when necessary overcoming 'border disputes' among them as, for example, if health care becomes subject to the imperative of profit making.

In this vision, social justice comes to be seen as a matter of 'spread responsibility', to use the Dutch concept: the full range of different kinds of social body fulfilling their distinct roles. The state certainly stands in the background and both has to fulfil its subsidiary role and, to the extent that social institutions fail, has to ensure justice by intervening in a way that is essentially substitutionary (just as happened in relation to some banks in the recent economic crisis in several countries). Yet maintaining social justice does not in the first place mean state action.

Political vision: inclusive, 'strong' democracy

Christian Democracy's economic vision and social vision are long-established. Never made real fully or perfectly (of course), they have helped to shape some countries, not only in Continental Europe but also in Latin America. However Christian Democracy offers a political vision that has, I think, been less fully explored theoretically than it could be and which has a huge amount to offer in the context of increasing religious plurality in many countries in the twenty first century. There is space here only to point towards this.

Christian Democracy shows Christians entirely committed to democracy and making it work at least as well as it works anywhere. Christian Democrats are not the religious culture warriors of the US right, even if there are some shared concerns, for example about upholding the quintessentially liberal principle of religious freedom. Nor are they like those Muslims who, having become disillusioned with secularised, unequal, morally relativist Western societies (understandably), are tempted to heed so-called 'radicalising' messages. The Western world, the whole world, desperately needs practically proven and intellectually coherent ways of relating religion and democracy. There are three main possibilities on offer. There is the unstable alliance of social conservatism and unalloyed neoliberalism that is found in so much of the US right and that is self-defined by defence in cultural war. There is the (purportedly) neutralist liberalism, increasingly dominant in English-speaking countries, that argues that religious voices should be kept out of public life and is largely oblivious to the alienation of increasing numbers of citizens it is causing. There is Christian Democracy, which shows, by contrast, that it is quite possible for a politics explicitly based on at least one religious foundation to lead not just to stability but to success and to fostering a form of society that is inclusive of people across religious as well as other divides. Of course, people of different religious and philosophical convictions are bound to disagree deeply about politics (contra the Rawlsian, neutralist myth), but the challenge is to forge a kind of democratic politics that is robust enough to handle people bringing their different convictions quite explicitly into public debate.²⁰ Does not Christian Democracy have something hugely important to offer here?

Christian Democracy for the UK?

In Britain in 2015, how might we think more concretely about Christian Democracy? It does have some history here. Most significantly, in 1990 a cross-party Movement for Christian Democracy (MCD) was established, largely at the initiative of Lord (David) Alton, then a Liberal Democrat MP. The MCD quickly attracted several thousand members. Some leading figures, notably David Campanale, concluded before long that they wished to establish a party, and he and others formed the Christian Peoples Alliance in the late 1990s. This came within a hair's breadth of winning a seat at the first London Assembly election in 2000; if it had done so the future might have been quite different. In fact, while there were ups and downs during the 2000s, that beginning was also its high point. In the 2015 general election it is fielding some candidates, but it is a weaker body in every way than a decade ago.

In the 2010s we have seen the development of the Red Tory and Blue Labour movements.²¹ Both articulate stances that are strikingly close to Christian Democracy and draw on some of the same sources, not least CST. Apart from them, the social liberalism that defined Liberal politics in Britain for a century but has been less to the fore recently is not far from Christian Democracy. (Michael Fogarty was a Liberal Party councillor for 25 years, there being no Christian Democratic party.) There is some obvious shared ground with the Greens, who are claiming to stand for 'the common good' in the current election campaign. While sentimental and tribal loyalty to the main parties is strong, is it possible that, in the new flux that seven parties in the television debate symbolises and that might intensify during the next Parliament, Red Tories and Blue Labour activists, along with a few non-secularist social liberals and Greens, could join together and forge an intellectually and politically serious Christian Democratic politics in Britain? Quite apart from party loyalty, British scepticism makes this unlikely. But if they were to do so, that could be significant for the whole English-speaking world. More importantly, it could be greatly conducive to justice, freedom and the common good, as the challenges of the twenty-first century become more acute.

Suggested Further Reading

- Philip Blond, *Red Tory: How the Left and Right Have Broken Britain and How We Can Fix It* (Faber & Faber, 2010).
- James D. Bratt, *Abraham Kuypers: Modern Calvinist, Christian Democrat* (Eerdmans, 2013).
- Michael Fogarty, *Phoenix or Cheshire Cat? Christian Democracy Past, Present... and Future?* (Christian Democrat Press, 1995).
- Ian Geary and Adrian Pabst, eds, *Blue Labour: Forging a New Politics* (I.B. Taurus, 2015).
- Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser, eds, *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945* (Routledge, 2004).
- Thomas A. Kselman and Joseph A. Buttigieg, eds, *European Christian Democracy: Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives* (University of Notre Dame Press, 2003).
- S.N. Kalyvas and K. van Kersbergen, 'Christian Democracy', *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (2010), 183-209, accessible (17 Apr. 2015) at <http://stathis.research.yale.edu/documents/annurev.polisci.11.021406.pdf>.
- Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds, *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts* (Stanford University Press, 2003).

Nicholas Townsend has worked in the private sector, in Parliament, and for many years in teaching Christian ethics and political thought, including as Director of the Politics and Theology Programme at Sarum College, Salisbury, at the South-East Institute for Theological Education / University of Kent, and for the Leadership Programme run by CARE. He is a KLICE Research Associate.

¹ Some parts of this article draw on work I have done for the Virtual Plater project based at Newman University, Birmingham (www.virtualplater.org.uk); I am grateful to David McLoughlin for his support for this work. I am indebted too to Jonathan Chaplin from whom I have learned a great deal about Christian Democracy; I learned much also from Richard Steenvoorde.

² See EPP, 'Member Parties European Union countries', at <http://www.epp.eu/sites/default/files/lmp.pdf>. UK Conservative Party MEPs were within the EPP until they left as a group in 2009. An issue intensely debated at times within the EPP is whether it should be open to parties that are not explicitly Christian Democratic in their roots or principles.

³ The story of the Dutch case is outlined by Michael Fogarty in 'How Dutch Christian Democrats Faced a New World', chapter 2 of his *Phoenix or Cheshire Cat? Christian Democracy Past, Present... and Future?* (Christian Democrat Press, 1995).

⁴ Michael Fogarty, *Motorways Merge: The New Challenge to Christian Democracy* (Christian Democrat Press, 1999), 1.

⁵ Michael Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), xvii. Michael Fogarty was learned, acute, open and gracious, and deeply committed to the promotion of Christian principles in British public life, for which he worked tirelessly for many decades, even into his 80s. In 2001, he came to a training day for tutors at Sarum College, Salisbury (where I worked), as though he needed to learn how to teach on Christian Democracy; this was just two months before he died.

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- ⁶ *Freedom Based on Responsibility: Principles and Programme of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany* (CDU Bundesgeschäftsstelle, 1994), ##1-2, accessible (16 April 2015) at <https://archive.org/details/PrinciplesAndProgramOfCduGermany>. I have amended the published English translation to make the references to human beings gender-inclusive. The CDU's current equivalent statement, *Freedom and Security: Principles for Germany* (2007), expresses the same vision in slightly different ways; it is accessible (6 April 2015) at http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_13533-544-2-30.pdf?110509134343.
- ⁷ Jacques Maritain, *Christianity and Democracy*, trans. Doris C. Anson (Geoffrey Bles, 1945). A later edition is accessible (16 April 2015) at <https://books.google.co.uk/books?isbn=1586176005>.
- ⁸ Germany gives a notable example. See Maria Mitchell, *The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany* (University of Michigan Press, 2012), 65.
- ⁹ According to Maria Mitchell, Barth held that all political doctrines, including Christian Democracy, were a form of idolatry. See, *Origins of Christian Democracy*, 65. That assessment arose basically from his opposition to all forms of natural theology, which left no grounds for the epistemological possibility of what he saw Christian Democracy as being.
- ¹⁰ Peter Heslam, *Creating a Christian Worldview: Abraham Kuyper's Lectures on Calvinism* (Eerdmans, 1998); James D. Bratt, *Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian Democrat* (Eerdmans, 2013).
- ¹¹ This term has been used at least since CDU's *Principles and Programme* of 1994, cited in note 6.
- ¹² In a fascinating but disturbing article, Fritz W. Scharpf argues that such pressure has been an effect, even if unintended, of judgments by the European Court of Justice on various socio-economic issues, as they rest on neoliberal premises that function, EU-wide, as a lower common denominator than those of the social market economy. See Scharpf, 'The asymmetry of European integration, or why the EU cannot be a "social market economy"', *Socio-Economic Review* 8.2 (2010), 211-250.
- ¹³ Peter Mandelson's famous statement symbolised the New Labour 'third way': he was 'intensely relaxed about people getting filthy rich, as long as they pay their taxes' (quoted in *The Guardian*, 21 December 2008).
- ¹⁴ Sometimes the label 'capitalism' is used of the social market economy, subject to one or other qualification: 'Rhine capitalism', 'social capitalism', 'the other capitalism'. That is not wrong if capitalism is unhelpfully taken as a label for any and every form of market economy. But it is misleading because, speaking precisely, the definitive feature of capitalism has been rejected, namely subjection of business activity to maximisation of return on capital – shareholder value – as the overriding end. The term 'social capitalism' is more fitting for the 'third way'. I address these issues in 'Transcending the Long Twentieth Century: Why We Should and How We Can Move to a Post-Capitalist Market Economy', in Sean Doherty and Jeremy Kidwell, eds, *Bringing Theology and Economics Together: A Christian Vision of the Common Good* (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming).
- ¹⁵ Heinrich Pesch SJ (1854-1926) taught two younger German Jesuits, Oswald von Nell-Breuning and Gustav Gundlach who, in turn, were closely involved in the writing of Pope Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno* (*QA*) of 1931; Nell-Breuning was its main drafter. By that route *QA* drew deeply on Pesch's solidarism, even though Pius XI did not use the word 'solidarity'. Pesch's influence continued under the next Pope: 'Pius XII came to rely heavily on Grundlach in particular for information about the economic order and the relevance of Christian moral principles to it. The influence of solidarist ideas is clear throughout that Pope's pronouncements addressed to economic matters.' (Rupert J. Ederer, *Pope Pius XII on the Economic Order*, Scarecrow Press, 2011, 12). His first use of 'solidarity' was in 1939 (*Summi Pontificatus*, ##34-35). As the end of war in Europe was in sight in March 1945, he addressed Italian Catholic workers in this way: 'The time has come... to attempt to organize the forces of the people on a new basis; to raise them above the distinction between employers and would-be workers, and to realize that higher unity which is a bond between all those who co-operate in production, formed by their *solidarity in the duty of working together for the common good* and filling together the needs of the community. If this solidarity is extended to all branches of production, if it becomes the foundation for a better economic system, it will lead the working classes to obtain honestly their share of responsibility in the direction of the national economy. Thus, thanks to such harmonious co-ordination and co-operation, thanks to this closer unity of labour with the other elements of economic life, the worker will receive, as a result of his activity, a secure remuneration, sufficient to meet his needs and those of his family' (Pope Pius XII, Address to the Congress of the Italian Catholic Workers' Association, 11 Mar. 1945, italics added, accessible (27 Nov. 2014) at <http://archive.thetablet.co.uk/article/24th-march-1945/5/ii-on-the-future-of-trade-unions>). We could almost see this as a charter for the social market economy.
- ¹⁶ *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (1987), #38.
- ¹⁷ I suggest that there is such extensive ground shared by Pesch's 'solidarism', the CDU's 'ecological and social market economy', and also the vision of a 'civil market economy' developed recently by the Italian economists Stefano Zamagni and Luigini Bruni – successors to Pesch in their influence on recent CST statements – that we may see all these as different ways of saying more or less the same thing. On Bruni and Zamagni, see their *Civil Economy: Efficiency, Equity, Public Happiness* (Peter Lang, 2007), Adrian Pabst, ed., *The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Pope Benedict XVI's Social Encyclical and the Future of Political Economy* (Cascade, 2011; James Clarke, 2012), and the website of Economy of Communion, <http://www.edc-online.org>.
- ¹⁸ 'Everyone is destined to and dependent on being able to live together with others in a community. The freedom of the individual is realised and upheld in his or her relations with other people and in the form given to social life.' CDU, *Freedom Based on Responsibility*, #9.
- ¹⁹ Fogarty, *Phoenix or Cheshire Cat*, 37.
- ²⁰ In different ways Benjamin Barber, Michael Sandel and Chantal Mouffe have advocated conceptions of democracy characterised by the recognition of the need for robust debate in which people can appeal to their deep convictions (religious or otherwise) despite the conflicts this reveals – 'strong democracy' in Barber's phrase, 'agonistic pluralism' in Mouffe's.
- ²¹ See Philip Blond, *Red Tory: How the Left and Right Have Broken Britain and How We Can Fix It* (Faber & Faber, 2010) and Ian Geary and Adrian Pabst, eds, *Blue Labour: Forging a New Politics* (I.B. Taurus, 2015).